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ABSTRACT 
 
This article traces the author’s involvement in cultural property protect since his role as archaeological 
advisor to the UK Ministry of Defence in 2003 with respect to the invasion of Iraq. It notes the failure of that 
work and the concerns raised by it within the archaeological community. The article notes the work of the 
‘Monuments Men’ in the Second World War and calls for closer collaboration between cultural property 
experts and the military in the future. The article also notes the author’s contact and work with the late 
Donny George. 
 
RESUMEN 
 
Este artículo analiza paso a paso la participación del autor en la protección de la propiedad cultural desde 
su papel como consejero arqueológico del Ministerio de Defensa británico en 2003 en relación con la 
invasión de Iraq. Señala el fracaso de este trabajo y las inquietudes suscitadas por él en la comunidad 
arqueológica. El artículo se fija asimismo en el trabajo que llevaron a cabo los conocidos como 'Monuments 
Men' durante la II Guerra Mundial y hace un llamamiento a favor de una colaboración más estrecha entre 
los expertos en propiedades culturales y los militares en el futuro. El artículo también reseña el contacto y el 
trabajo del autor con el difunto Donny George. 
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I first met Donny George on 29 April 2003 at a hastily convened meeting at the 
British Museum entitled ‘International Support for Iraq’s Museums’ organised to discuss 
the looting, that month, of the Iraq National Museum in Baghdad and other regional 
museums across Iraq. The looting followed what many still regard as the illegal invasion of 
the country by the Coalition led by the USA and UK. Donny, then Director of Research at 
the Iraqi State Board of Antiquities and Heritage, had travelled out of Iraq with John Curtis 
from the British Museum, at considerable risk to them both, to attend the meeting. It was 
not surprising that I did not know Donny, nor that I had actually never heard of him – and 
equally that he had absolutely no knowledge of me. I was not a specialist in the 
archaeology and antiquities of the early civilisations of the Middle East; had (and still 
have) not visited Iraq; and, until a few weeks before our meeting, had, only been 
marginally aware of the quality and extent of the archaeological remains in the country. I 
did have a very slight edge over many of the general population in that, early in my career, 
I had spent two years working as a secondary school history teacher and had taught a very 
brief sketch of ‘Early Civilisation in the land between the two rivers’. As such I knew a 
little more than many others of, for example, the remains at Ur and Babylon and had stood 
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in some awe before the Sumerian antiquities on show in galleries a few hundred feet away 
from the seminar room in which that April meeting was held. However, on that April 
morning that limited knowledge was hardly relevant. I felt, and was, totally out-of-place in 
the room. Apart perhaps from a small group from the Getty Conservation Institute and two 
individuals from the Netherlands military, who had their own specialities and reasons for 
being at the meeting, a roll call of those present would have revealed some of the most 
eminent experts in one or other aspect of the archaeology of the Middle East: Certainly not 
my usual company. 
That I was present at all was the result of what I have referred to as “a particularly 
English tale” (Stone 2005/2008). A few weeks before the meeting, on 2 February, I had 
been approached by an individual in the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) to help identify 
and protect the archaeological cultural heritage in Iraq if there were to be an invasion. 
Given my lack of expertise the approach was more than a little odd, but came from 
someone at the very centre of planning for the possible invasion who knew me personally 
(for a full discussion of my role in this period see Stone 2005/2008). My contact was part 
of a small group within the MoD tasked with identifying what should be targeted for attack 
and, most importantly from a cultural heritage perspective, what should specifically be 
avoided if at all possible. He knew that I was not an expert in the archaeology of the region 
but surmised, correctly, that, given my connections, partly through my work as honorary 
Chief Executive Officer of the World Archaeological Congress (WAC), I would know 
someone who was and, given my work in heritage management, I would know which 
questions to ask. With advice from Roger Matthews, the most recent Director of the British 
School of Archaeology in Iraq, and Neil Brodie, then Director of the Illicit Antiquities 
Research Centre at Cambridge, and through Roger with colleagues in Iraq, I had been able 
to do three things before the invasion: deliver a list of key sites; stress the vulnerability of 
sites and museums immediately after conflict and before a stable external Interim or new 
Iraqi authority was in place; and remind my contacts of their responsibilities under 
International treaties. In this facet of my work I had focused on the UK’s obligations under 
the Geneva Conventions as the UK had not (and as I write in 2012 still has not) ratified the 
most relevant piece of international legislation - the 1954 Hague Convention on the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its two protocols of 
1954 and 1999 (hereafter the 1954 Hague Convention). I understand that three further 
things happened before the invasion: the sites we listed went onto military maps and into 
field orders to avoid if possible; the information was shared with Coalition partners; and 
the sites went onto the UK Attorney General’s so-called ‘no-strike list’ – a list of places 
such as hospitals, religious buildings, and schools that should not be fired upon unless they 
were being used for belligerent military activity against Coalition forces. However, in 
briefings with the MoD I had made it perfectly clear that the best way to avoid damage to 
cultural property was not to start a war in the first place. In this I had had to steer a careful 
line: I disliked the idea of a war but was being asked to put that aside and face reality (it 
was put to me on a number of occasions that I was dealing with the ‘only act in town’); I 
knew that I could work with the MoD or wash my hands of the issue, knowing that they 
would not identify or consult another archaeologist. My personal decision was to work 
with the MoD. 
During the initial stages of fighting everything that had been set in place to protect 
archaeological cultural property appeared to be working. This can be ascribed mainly to 
the speed of the Coalition’s advance, the failure of the Iraqi military to affect any major 
defence (or its decision not to attempt such a defence), and the remoteness of many sites. 
Then, in mid-April, it became clear that the National Museum and a number of regional 
museums had been looted; we could only assume at this point that, if the Coalition forces 
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had failed to stop the looting of museums, it would only be a matter of time before we 
heard of the looting of archaeological sites. There was almost universal outrage across the 
world’s media regarding the looting and condemnation of the Coalition for its failure to 
protect the cultural heritage in Iraq. As honorary CEO of WAC my email in-box was full 
of messages not only condemning the failures of Coalition forces but also, given the 
prominent role of the UK in the Coalition, seriously questioning the British Museum’s 
announcement on 15 April that “it was going to take the initiative in providing assistance 
to the Iraq Museum, and would act as the coordinator for other museums” (Curtis 2008, 
202). 
It was with this background that I attended the British Museum meeting. We 
initially heard first-hand accounts of the recent events and current situation in Iraq from 
Donny and John Curtis followed by discussion of a list of preliminary suggested 
recommendations concerning action that needed to be taken quickly, drawn up by Donny 
in collaboration with the British Museum (and see Curtis 2008, 203/4). At this stage almost 
the entire focus was on the National Museum as Donny had very limited information 
regarding the looting of other museums and no clear information regarding archaeological 
sites. There was limited discussion regarding how the post conflict administration of Iraq 
would work under the newly created ‘Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance’ and how the State Board and museums would relate to it – if at all. 
The meeting then discussed issues more generally and two issues, with potentially 
major detrimental impact, were noted as being of particular concern. First, it was clear that 
Coalition troops on duty at border checkpoints were not searching for illicit antiquities – or 
for very much other than senior officials of the recent regime. The potential for antiquities 
looted from museums and, it was surmised archaeological sites, to slip out of the country 
was evident to all. Second, there was significant concern raised over the probability of 
Coalition troops being offered illicit antiquities as souvenirs as they returned home; the 
need for all troops to be searched and educated not to collect or purchase antiquities was 
also very clear. 
I then asked what I prefaced might seem an inappropriate question given the venue 
but, on behalf of the members of WAC who had been so enraged by the positioning of the 
British Museum, queried whether, under the particular circumstances of this extremely 
contentious conflict, the British Museum was actually the best institution to lead the 
international effort to support archaeological colleagues in Iraq. As I asked my question I 
sensed that Donny was having some difficulty in following my line of argument. I put this 
down, completely incorrectly as I later discovered, to him having difficulty in following 
my English and cursed my convoluted way of attempting to ask the question politely 
while, it could be claimed, explicitly criticising my hosts. I remember him looking 
quizzically at John Curtis - who a few days before, at considerable personal risk, had been 
one of the first archaeologists into Iraq after the invasion and who had spirited Donny out 
of Iraq - and again thinking that Donny did not understand my English. I then received, 
what I later learnt was a frequent gesture from him, as Donny hunched his shoulders, 
raised his hands, and knocked back his head. His appearance had had nothing to do with 
his mastery of English but his bemusement and incredulity at my question: “No”, he 
replied in perfect English, there was no conflict of interest in the Iraqi State Board of 
Antiquities being offered help co-ordinated and led by the British Museum. Indeed, he 
continued, the British Museum was ideally and uniquely placed to take this role given the 
depth of knowledge in the Museum regarding the archaeology of the region and the long 
history of partnership working between the two organisations whose staff knew and 
respected each other. In his response, Donny revealed himself to be a supreme pragmatist, 
keenly interested and engaged in things he was passionate about and that, with help and the 
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correct circumstances, he might be able to influence. As the meeting broke up for lunch I 
was approached by colleagues from the Getty Conservation Institute who thanked me for 
asking the question as it was an issue that had been at the forefront of their own minds – 
but that they had felt it inappropriate to ask. Donny’s strong response had reassured them 
that the planned international response was a sound, realistic, and appropriate one. Little 
did we all realise that the spiralling decline in security in Iraq would make nearly all of the 
plans discussed that day impossible to implement. 
Over lunch I was approached by the two individuals from the Netherlands military 
who were also attending the meeting. They introduced themselves as part of the ‘CIMIC’ 
team of the Netherlands armed forces – a term that I had never consciously heard. They 
enthusiastically explained how the Dutch system provide cultural experts with intensive, 
basic military training, give them an officer’s rank, and embed them in the military to 
enable them to provide some limited capability for the protection of cultural property 
during conflict (and see Kila 2010; Teijgeler 2008). It was my first introduction to any 
form of organised cultural property protection (see below). 
In the afternoon there was a Press conference at the British Museum where Donny 
shared a platform with Tessa Jowell, then the UK’s Secretary of State for Culture. Before 
the Press Conference the audience, that included more than twenty TV news film crews 
from around the world following the story of the looting of the National Museum, heard a 
presentation, entitled (from my programme) ‘Mesopotamian collections in Europe and the 
US’. The TV crews obviously did not fully understand the script as, as the audience were 
shown highlights from the British Museum’s collection, the first question was whether the 
object on the screen had been looted recently from the National Museum in Iraq. When the 
answer was a surprised “no it’s two floors above you” the TV crews lost interest and 
waited for Donny and the Secretary of State to make their appearance. The irony of the 
situation was not lost on some of those present, however, as most of the objects had been 
removed from Iraq either without permission or through ‘partage’ – the old system of 
dividing the finds from an excavation between the ‘developing’ source country where the 
excavation took place and the museum or university from the ‘developed world’ that had 
undertaken the excavation. In this short presentation the whole dilemma of so-called 
‘world museums’ protecting objects from unstable countries, cultural dominance, structural 
violence, and contemporary colonialism was played out in front of an unsuspecting and un-
noticing audience of the world’s media. What Donny made of it I simply do not know. 
Immediately following the meeting on 29 April, I went back to the MoD to raise 
the concerns discussed and I understand, as a result, three additional things happened: all 
UK military personnel leaving Iraq were searched for antiquities; UK troops with border 
responsibilities were briefed to be vigilant for the smuggling of illicit antiquities; and all 
troops and other UK personnel deploying to Iraq were provided with a short briefing note 
(drafted by Roger Matthews) about the extent and importance of the archaeology of the 
area. I understand these activities continued until 2009 when UK forces withdrew from 
Iraq. Unfortunately, these efforts had little long term impact given the extent of looting and 
destruction of the archaeological record that continued, and still continues to some degree, 
in Iraq. 
From a cultural property perspective, the whole Iraq conflict can only be regarded 
as a complete catastrophe. As events in 2003 unfolded I was very aware that individuals 
were having to take decisions very quickly, frequently without the full necessary 
information, and with limited belief that any such decisions would, or could, be 
implemented. I was also very aware that how and why decisions were made in this way 
would be quickly forgotten if a record were not kept. I therefore decided to try to gather the 
experiences of key individuals into a book that I hoped would act as a sort of diary of 
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events. Initially, I hoped the book could be produced by the beginning of 2004 but as the 
months passed, and the situation in Iraq deteriorated and became more complex, it became 
clear that the whole sorry event was going to be a much longer drawn out affair than 
anyone had foreseen. It was also clear that such a book needed to incorporate as many 
voices as possible. During the fifth World Archaeological Congress, held in Washington 
DC in June 2003 (and itself boycotted by a number of archaeologists who felt it 
inappropriate to meet in the capital city of a belligerent nation that had taken, in many 
minds, the world to an illegal and unnecessary war) I therefore asked the archaeologist and 
journalist Joanne Farchakh Bajjaly to co-edit the book with me. Joanne agreed and one of 
the tasks she took on was to ensure that Donny write a chapter relating his experiences of 
the looting of the National Museum. As the months passed and the situation in Iraq 
worsened Donny failed to find the time to write his chapter and so Joanne travelled to 
Baghdad to interview him, sending the tapes to the UK to be transcribed and edited. Other 
key contributors were less easy to pin down and the production of the book dragged on 
until early 2007 by which time Donny had been forced to leave Iraq for the safety of his 
family. This personal tragedy had a positive outcome for the book, as Donny contacted us 
saying that he wanted to add a section to his chapter exploring who had been responsible 
for the looting and why – a section he felt he could not write while in post in Iraq. In this 
he identified political, educational, and economic reasons for the looting. I found his 
additional text particularly pertinent, interesting, and depressing, as it touched on work that 
I had been involved in for many years: the importance of ensuring an appropriate place for 
the study of the past in the school curriculum and the manipulation of the past in education 
for political ends (see, for example, Stone and MacKenzie 1990; Stone and Molyneaux 
1994; Stone and Planel 1999). The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq was finally 
published in 2008. 
Donny’s observations provided an Iraqi context for the Coalition’s failures in Iraq, 
but they did not provide all of the reasons for the debacle. In retrospect, there appear to 
have been four main causes for what the journalist Thomas E Ricks (2006) describes as 
“Fiasco”. Most obvious and of fundamental importance, there was a failure to deploy 
enough troops: even with the best will in the world it is a simple axiom that no military 
commander can do everything on their agenda if there are not enough troops available to 
carry out orders. Second, there appears to have been an astonishing failure to plan for 
anything other than a positive and benign post conflict Iraq: the simplistic notion that 
Coalition forces could win the conflict within months, if not weeks, and be ‘back for 
Christmas’ appears to have obviated any deeper thinking or planning. Third, there was a 
complete failure to acknowledge the potential importance of cultural property and cultural 
heritage to what was essentially a society removed, unknown, and alien to those planning 
the invasion. From the widespread humiliation of Iraqi men in front of women, to the 
failure to protect the icons of Iraqi culture - such as the national and regional museums and 
the country’s libraries and archives - to the unnecessary damage to archaeological sites and 
monuments by the poorly planned placing of military camps, to failing to prevent the 
widespread looting of archaeological sites, the Coalition seems almost to have gone out of 
its way to antagonise the local population (Curtis 2008; Moussa 2008; Ricks 2006; Steele 
2008). Finally, and of crucial importance to the cultural heritage community, it was our 
failure to maintain the close relationship that had existed previously with the military, in 
particular during the Second World War, that allowed the extreme ignorance displayed. It 
is clear that if the cultural heritage community fail to engage with the military in this new 
century then we have no right to complain in the future if the military fail to protect 
cultural property and cultural heritage (and see Stone 2011b). 
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Not all agree with me and, by June 2003, my advisory role was provoking harsh 
and sustained criticism from a small group of archaeologists who argued, from an ethical 
standpoint, that not only was I wrong to work with the military but that this work ‘provided 
academic and cultural legitimacy to the invasion’ (Hamilakis 2003, 107). Hamilakis 
regarded my involvement as part of the wider ‘ethical crisis in archaeology’ in which 
archaeologists can ‘publicly mourn the loss of artefacts but find no words for the loss of 
people’ (Hamilakis 2003, 107; and see Hamilakis 2009). 
The criticism of my role was part of a focused response reflecting a wider literature 
(see, for example, Albarella 2009; Bernbeck 2008a; & 2008b; Hamilakis and Dukes 2007; 
Ronayne 2002; 2007) and more general archaeological opposition to the invasion of Iraq 
which manifested itself in an active group calling themselves ‘Archaeologists Against the 
War’ (and see http://agj.group.shef.ac.uk/). Indeed, the issue had been identified as 
important long before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and WAC had held an Inter-Congress 
(1998), set up a Task Force on the ‘Destruction of Cultural Property in Conflict Situations’ 
in 1999 (Ronayne 2000), and published Destruction and Conservation of Cultural 
Property (Layton et al 2001). However, given WAC’s financial and resource limitations at 
the time, no further practical proactive measures had been possible. 
I have addressed these criticisms elsewhere (Stone 2011b) and do not repeat this 
discussion here. Suffice to say that my view remains the same as it was in 2003: if cultural 
heritage experts do not engage (in a structured, careful way) then we cannot blame the 
military in the future for damage to cultural property during armed conflict. Having been 
through two military invasions, Donny understood this better than most and since 2003 I 
worked with him and a small group of international colleagues, both in and out of uniform, 
to ensure that cultural property protection (CPP) during armed conflict remained on the 
agenda at archaeological meetings and in archaeological and military minds. We hope, and 
have had some limited success, in getting the military to engage with the issue and it is 
currently viewed by most NATO forces as what the military refer to as a ‘force multiplier’ 
– something that actually can help them achieve their military objectives (see, for example, 
chapters in Rush 2010; Stone 2011a). A key event has been the annual conference of the 
Archaeological Institute of America (AIA) where, fully supported by its, now ex, President 
Brian Rose, archaeologists and military staff have gathered to share experiences of 
working together and the development of networks (and see 
http://www.archaeological.org/advocacy/military). This work continues under the current 
AIA President Elizabeth Bartman. Donny was an ever present presence at these meetings, 
not letting us forget the pressing need to develop better working relations before conflict 
flares again. In one of his last emails to me he stressed “...always we need to do anything to 
raise the awareness, speak out and do our best to the final direction to protect the cultural 
heritage, and that’s what matters”. 
The astonishing failure of politicians and the military to recognise the importance 
of cultural property in Iraq in 2003 is made all the worse given the close working 
relationship that had existed during the Second World War between cultural heritage 
experts and the Allied military. In part this had been a reaction to the unprecedented 
targeting and looting of Europe’s cultural property by the Nazi hierarchy; in part a 
realisation by Allied commanders of the importance of cultural property (Edsel 2009; 
Nicholas 1995; Spirydowicz 2010; Woolley 1947). Regardless of its genesis, the work 
carried out by these ‘Monuments Men’, who did so much to protect the archaeological 
(and especially architectural and artistic) legacy of European civilisation during the latter 
part of the war, seemingly simply withered on the vine as conscripted experts returned to 
their civilian worlds. That little was put in place to replace them, while understandable in a 
world exhausted by war, must be seen as a significant criticism of both the military and 
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cultural heritage community (for the limited work in this field after 1945 see Rush 2010). 
Emberling (2008, 449) suggests that the “major difference between [the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq] and the consultation of concerned scholars about cultural property in World War II is 
the relative lack of concern of the President [US President Bush] and top military 
leadership for the issue” and concludes that cultural heritage experts need to get their 
message across not only to the military but also at the highest political levels. 
In retrospect, it is a damning indictment of the military process that the staff of the 
MoD who approached me for advice in 2003 were totally unaware that the MoD itself 
employed archaeologists to protect the archaeological sites and landscapes in the MoD’s 
UK Training Areas (see, for example, Brown 2010); I have since learnt that this effort is 
dwarfed by the archaeological activity of the Department of Defense (DoD) in the USA 
(Rush 2010; 2011). Unfortunately, regardless of the quality of the work of, and training 
provided by, the Defence Estates archaeological team or their US or European equivalents, 
unlike the ‘Monuments Men’ their responsibility, and certainly their influence, on cultural 
property protection (CPP) once forces are deployed - primarily, but not exclusively, 
overseas – was, and remains, effectively non-existent. 
The British Army did eventually work closely with archaeologists, led by staff from 
the British Museum, and a mutually acceptable working relationship developed (Clarke 
2010; Curtis 2008; Curtis 2011; Curtis et al 2008). This relationship was, however, not 
straightforward and, echoing some of the criticism of my role in 2003, Curtis (2011, 196) 
notes his refusal to work with the military prior to conflict. Curtis does however see it as 
appropriate to work with the military in a post-conflict situation, where it is only military 
facilitation that allows CPP to take place although this too has been questioned (Hamilakis 
2009, 48, Rowlands 2011). In an attempt to address some of the issues raised by Bernbeck, 
Curtis and others, I am currently trying to develop a 4 phase model of when and how 
cultural heritage experts can and should work with the military (Stone forthcoming). 
Whether one believes that cultural heritage experts should or should not work with the 
military, one thing is certain: the work done with respect to Iraq was too little, far too late. 
There is still much to do. The UK has still failed to ratify the 1954 Hague Convention and 
there is a long way to go before the whole military machine and its political masters take 
CPP seriously. I, and others, continue to work towards these aims; that we have lost Donny 
from the team does not mean the work stops: Far from it. 
I last saw Donny at the annual meeting of the AIA held in San Antonio in January 
2011. He had been worried about finding the funding to go to the meeting, and we had 
joked in emails in December 2010 that we needed to find a bank to rob to get us to the 
meeting with my final suggestion that I would bring the masks, if he brought the get-away 
car... When we met in San Antonio Donny was very amused that I was fulfilling a 
childhood dream of visiting the Alamo, the scene of some very contentious history 
misappropriated and mis- (or at the very least overtly simplistically) represented by 
Hollywood. More relevantly, Donny was very excited that Joanne Farchakh Bajjaly and I 
were there to receive the James R. Wiseman Book Award for our co-edited volume The 
Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq, in which his chapter described above appeared. 
Donny’s excitement was not just that we had won a prize, although he was genuinely 
pleased about the honour, but more that the award kept the destruction as a high profile 
issue in the general archaeological consciousness. On the afternoon of the evening award 
ceremony, he worked with me to try and persuade Joanne to make the acceptance speech 
but we both failed as she claimed her English was not good enough to stand in front of an 
audience and speak in English (despite the fact she has done this many times). We sat for 
over an hour laughing as she avoided our pressure and as we discussed the draft of what 
we wanted to say: once again agreeing that the precise wording of our thanks did not 
Cultural property protection: a clear responsibility 
64 
matter particularly, but that we should use the speech as a platform and opportunity for 
maintaining the profile of our continuing work to raise the issue of CPP within archaeology 
and the military. 
Later that evening a group of us went for a meal. We decided to walk to the 
restaurant as our local guide claimed it was very close to the hotel but the distance was 
obviously a significant challenge for Donny. It was noticeable that he had put on a 
significant amount of weight and he walked leaning heavily on a stick. Joanne remained 
with him as he walked slowly and took rests while I hovered between them and the main 
group ensuring we did not lose sight of them and the route to our supper. After the meal we 
shared a taxi for the short distance back to the hotel. I left early the next day without seeing 
Donny. It was with great shock that I heard of his death in early March. We had not been 
close, but our friendship was growing and I shall treasure my memories of him and, in 
particular, that hour spent in San Antonio. Donny collapsed at Toronto International airport 
while in the city to give another lecture on the looting and destruction of museums and 
sites in Iraq. His later life had been dominated by the events prompted by the 2003 
invasion and he had worked tirelessly, and, as we now know, to the detriment of his health, 
to maintain the issues in the academic, military, and public eye. His death is but another 
tiny, but directly attributable, statistic to add to the tragedy of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It 
makes me even more determined to work to ensure that the protection of cultural property 
develops a high profile in military and political minds so that no politician can ever again 
say (as did US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld) “stuff happens”; nor military 
commander assert (attributed to General Tommy Franks) that “I don’t have time for this ---
-ing bullshit!” 
 
 
 
Receiving the James R. Wiseman Book Award at the 2011 AIA Conference. 
(L to R) Patty Gerstenblith, Donny George, Matthew Bogdanos, 
Joanne Farchakh Bajjaly, and the author. 
(Fot. Serena Bellew) 
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